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United States District Court,
N.D. California.
ABDUL NEVAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
FORTY NINERS FOOTBALL
COMPANY, LLC, et al., Defendants.
Case No. 16-CV-07013
|
08/15/2017
LUCY H. KOH, United States District Judge
ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO
COMPEL ARBITRATION Re: Dkt. No. 60
*1  Plaintiffs Abdul Nevarez (“Mr. Nevarez”),
Priscilla Nevarez (“Mrs. Nevarez”), and Sebastian
DeFrancesco (“DeFrancesco”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”)
sue Defendants Forty Niners Football Company, LLC;
Forty Niners SC Stadium Company, LLC; Forty
Niners Stadium Management Company, LLC; the City
of Santa Clara; the Santa Clara Stadium Authority
(together, the “Stadium Defendants”), in addition to
Live Nation Entertainment, Inc. (“Live Nation”); and
Ticketmaster, LLC (“Ticketmaster”) (together with Live
Nation Entertainment Inc., “Ticketmaster Defendants”).
ECF No. 50. Before the Court is Ticketmaster Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration. ECF No. 60. Having
considered the parties' submissions, the relevant law,
and the record in this case, the Court hereby GRANTS
Ticketmaster Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
Stadium Defendants own, lease, and operate Levi's
Stadium in Santa Clara, California, which is the home
stadium of the San Francisco Forty Niners professional
football team (hereinafter, “the Stadium”). ECF No. 50,
at ¶¶ 1, 9 (Second Amended Complaint, or “SAC”).
The Stadium also hosts several other events throughout
the year. Id. ¶ 2. Plaintiffs in this case allege that, on
several occasions, they visited the Stadium for events, but
discovered that the Stadium was not fully accessible to
disabled individuals.
Ticketmaster Defendants provide seating services and
parking passes for the Stadium, which they make
available through the website www.ticketmaster.com
(“the Ticketmaster Website”). Id. ¶ 10. Plaintiffs allege
that Ticketmaster Defendants fail and refuse to provide
accessible seating and accessible parking to persons
with mobility disabilities and that, when Ticketmaster
Defendants do provide accessible seating and accessible
parking, they fail to provide accessible seating and
accessible parking on equal terms as they provide non-
accessible seating and parking. Id. ¶¶ 17–18.
The instant arbitration dispute concerns Plaintiffs' use of
the Ticketmaster Website to purchase tickets and parking
passes for events at the Stadium, and the arbitration
agreement contained within the Ticketmaster Website's
Terms of Use (“TOU”). 1  The Court first addresses the
process of purchasing a ticket or parking pass through
the Ticketmaster Website, and the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU. The Court then addresses Plaintiffs' use of the
Ticketmaster Website.
1. Purchasing a Ticket or Parking Pass Through the
Ticketmaster Website
To purchase a ticket or parking pass through the
Ticketmaster Website, a user must have an account on the
Ticketmaster Website and the user must be signed in to
that account. ECF No. 60-1 (“Han Decl.”), at ¶¶ 3–4.
*2  In order to create an account on the Ticketmaster
Website, a user must complete the “Create Account”
webpage on the Ticketmaster Website. Id. ¶ 4. The “Create
Account” webpage asks the user to fill out required
information, such as the user's name and e-mail address.
See ECF No. 60-4. In order to proceed past the “Create
Account” webpage, a user must click the button “Accept
and Continue.” Id. Below the “Accept and Continue”
button, in black bold text against a white background, is
the sentence: “By continuing past this page, you agree to
our terms of use.” Id. The words “terms of use” are in
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blue text, and these words hyperlink to the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU. Id. A screenshot of this webpage is
displayed below:
Editor's Note: Tabular or graphical material not
displayable at this time.
Clicking on the “terms of use” hyperlink brings users
to the Ticketmaster Website's TOU webpage. The
Ticketmaster Website's TOU state that the TOU “govern
[the user's] use of the Ticketmaster sites and applications.”
See ECF No. 60-2, at 2. The TOU include information
on making purchases on the Ticketmaster Website and
registering an account. Id.  Further, the TOU contain a
section with the title, in bold font, “Disputes, Including
Mandatory Arbitration and Class Action Waiver.” Id.
at 6. The paragraph below this bold title contains an
arbitration provision, which has been in the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU since June 15, 2011. See Han Decl. ¶ 2.
This arbitration provision provides that “[a]ny dispute or
claim relating in any way to your use of the Site, or to
products or services sold or distributed by us or through
us, will be resolved by binding arbitration rather than in
court.” See ECF No. 60-2, at 6. This paragraph continues
as follows:
The arbitration agreement in these
[TOU] is governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act (FAA), including
its procedural provisions, in all
respects. This means that the FAA
governs, among other things, the
interpretation and enforcement of
this arbitration agreement and all
of its provisions, including without
limitation, the class action waiver
discussed below. State arbitration
laws do not govern in any
respect. The arbitration agreement is
intended to be broadly interpreted,
and will survive termination of
these Terms. The arbitrator, and
not any federal, state or local
court or agency, shall have exclusive
authority to the extent permitted
by law to resolve all disputes
arising out of or relating to
the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability or formation of this
Agreement, including, but not
limited to any claim that all or any
part of this Agreement is void or
voidable. There is no judge or jury
in arbitration....We each agree that
the arbitrator may not consolidate
more than one person's claims,
and may not otherwise preside
over any form of a representative
or class proceeding, and that any
dispute resolution proceedings will
be conducted only on an individual
basis and not in a class, consolidated
or representative action. You agree
to waive any right to a jury trial or
to participate in a class action.”
Id. This arbitration provision further states that
“[p]ayment of all filing, administration and arbitrator fees
will be governed by JAMS's rules. We will reimburse
those fees for claims totaling less than $10,000 unless the
arbitrator determines the claims are frivolous, but in no
event will we pay for attorneys' fees.” Id.
If a user already has an account on the Ticketmaster
Website, a user must sign in to that account before
purchasing a ticket or parking pass on the Ticketmaster
Website. See Han Decl. ¶ 5. On the “Sign In to My
Account” webpage, a user must fill in their e-mail
address and password before clicking “Sign In.” See ECF
No. 60-5. Below the “Sign In” button, in bold black
text against a white background, is the sentence “By
continuing past this page, you agree to our terms of
use.” Id. Again, the words “terms of use” are in blue
text, and these words hyperlink to the same TOU set
forth above, which contains the Ticketmaster Website
arbitration provision. Id.  A screenshot of this webpage is
displayed below:
*3  Editor's Note: Tabular or graphical material not
displayable at this time.
Once a user has registered an account or, if the user is
an existing user, signed in to that account, a user may
purchase a ticket or parking pass on the Ticketmaster
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Website. See Han Decl. ¶ 5. Users of the Ticketmaster
Website must “affirmatively assent to the [Ticketmaster
Website TOU] each time they purchase tickets or parking
passes” on the Ticketmaster Website. Id. Specifically, after
the user has selected his or her ticket and entered his or
her credit card and billing information, the user must click
“Submit Order” to complete the order. See ECF No. 60-6.
Below the “Submit Order” button is the sentence, in black
bold text against a white background, “By continuing past
this page, you agree to our terms of use.” Id.  Again,
the words “terms of use” are in blue font, and these
words hyperlink to the TOU set forth above, which
contain the Ticketmaster Website arbitration provision.
Id. Moreover, on the same “Submit Order” page—to
the left of the “Submit Order” button—is the text “[b]y
clicking the ‘Submit Order’ button, you are agreeing to
the Ticketmaster Purchase Policy and Privacy Policy.” Id.
The words “Purchase Policy” and “Privacy Policy” are in
blue text, and these words hyperlink to the Ticketmaster
Website Purchase Policy and Privacy Policy, respectively.
Id. A screenshot of this webpage is displayed below:
Editor's Note: Tabular or graphical material not
displayable at this time.
The first paragraph of Ticketmaster's Purchase Policy
instructs users to “review our Terms of Use which govern
your use of our Site.” See ECF No. 60-7, at 2. Again, the
words “Terms of Use” are in blue text and hyperlink to
the Ticketmaster Website's TOU set forth above, which
contain the Ticketmaster Website arbitration provision.
See id.
2. Plaintiffs' Use of the Ticketmaster Website
Plaintiffs used the Ticketmaster Website to purchase
an accessible parking pass for a November 29, 2015
Supercross event at the Stadium. See SAC ¶ 27.
Plaintiffs allege that the Ticketmaster Website did not
have handicap accessible parking passes available at the
standard price, so Plaintiffs were forced to purchase a
“VIP parking pass” at an extra cost. Id.  Nonetheless,
Plaintiffs allege, when Plaintiffs arrived at the Stadium on
the day of the event, “[t]here were many empty accessible
spaces” available in standard priced lots. Id.
Plaintiffs also attempted to purchase on the Ticketmaster
Website a block of tickets for an April 2, 2016 Supercross
event at the Stadium. Id. ¶ 34. However, “there were no
accessible seats available on the [Ticketmaster Website]
for the event.” Id.  Plaintiffs purchased regular tickets
through the Ticketmaster Website with the hope of
exchanging Mr. Nevarez's regular seat for a handicap
accessible seat at the Stadium on the day of the event. Id.
¶ 35.
B. Procedural History
On December 7, 2016, the Nevarezes filed suit against the
Forty Niners Football Company, LLC; Forty Niners SC
Stadium Company LLC; the National Football League;
the City of Santa Clara; the Santa Clara Stadium
Authority; and Ticketmaster LLC. ECF No. 1.
*4  On December 30, 2017, the Nevarezes filed a First
Amended Complaint (“FAC”). ECF No. 9. On February
3, 2017, Ticketmaster answered the FAC. ECF No. 21.
On February 7, 2017, the Forty Niners Defendants,
the National Football League, and the Santa Clara
Defendants each filed motions to dismiss the FAC. ECF
Nos. 28, 30, 32.
On March 17, 2017, the Nevarezes voluntarily dismissed
with prejudice the National Football League as a
defendant. ECF No. 39.
On April 12, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation to permit
the Nevarezes to file a SAC. ECF No. 46. The Court
granted the parties' stipulation on April 13, 2017. ECF No.
47. In light of the anticipated SAC, the Court denied as
moot the pending motions to dismiss the FAC. ECF No.
47.
On April 13, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a SAC. ECF No. 50.
The SAC added DeFrancesco as a Plaintiff, and added
Forty Niners Stadium Management Company LLC and
Live Nation as Defendants. Id.
Plaintiffs alleged three causes of action in the SAC. First,
Plaintiffs alleged that the Forty Niners Defendants and
the Ticketmaster Defendants violated Title III of the
Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (“ADA”), 42
U.S.C. § 12101. Second, Plaintiffs alleged that the Santa
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Clara Defendants violated Title II of the ADA. Third,
Plaintiffs alleged that all Defendants violated California's
Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”), Cal. Civ. Code §
51. Id.
On April 28, 2017, the Ticketmaster Defendants answered
the SAC. ECF No. 56. On May 1, 2017, the Forty
Niners Defendants and the Santa Clara Defendants filed
a motion to dismiss. ECF No. 58. On May 15, 2017,
Plaintiffs filed an opposition. ECF No. 59. On June 5,
2017, the Forty Niners Defendants and the Santa Clara
Defendants filed a reply. ECF No. 65.
On May 17, 2017, Ticketmaster Defendants filed a motion
to compel arbitration. ECF No. 60 (“Mot.”). On June
16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an opposition to Ticketmaster
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration. ECF No.
67 (“Opp.”). Also on June 16, 2017, Plaintiffs filed an
administrative motion to file under seal documents in
support of their opposition. ECF No. 68. On July 10,
2017, Ticketmaster Defendants filed a reply to Plaintiffs'
opposition. ECF No. 69 (“Reply). On July 17, 2017,
Plaintiffs filed an objection to Ticketmaster Defendants'
Reply. ECF No. 70. 2
*5  On August 1, 2017, the Court granted in part and
denied in part the Stadium Defendants' motion to dismiss
the SAC. ECF No. 76.
Also on August 1, 2017, Plaintiffs filed a request
for judicial notice in support of their opposition to
Ticketmaster Defendants' motion to compel arbitration.
ECF No. 67.
II. LEGAL STANDARD
The Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) applies to
arbitration agreements in any contract affecting interstate
commerce. See Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S.
105, 119 (2001); 9 U.S.C. § 2. Under Section 3 of the FAA,
“a party may apply to a federal court for a stay of the trial
of an action ‘upon any issue referable to arbitration under
an agreement in writing for such arbitration.’ ” Rent-A-
Center, West, Inc. v. Jackson, 561 U.S. 63 (2010) (quoting
9 U.S.C. § 3). If all claims in litigation are subject to a valid
arbitration agreement, the court may dismiss or stay the
case. See Hopkins & Carley, ALC v. Thomson Elite, 2011
WL 1327359, at *7–8 (N.D. Cal.
Apr. 6, 2011).
“For any arbitration agreement within the coverage of the
FAA, the court is to make the arbitrability determination
by applying the federal substantive law of arbitrability,
absent clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties
agreed to apply non-federal arbitrability law.” Brennan v.
Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125, 1129 (9th Cir. 2015) (citations
and brackets omitted). In deciding whether a dispute is
arbitrable, a federal court must answer two questions:
(1) whether the parties agreed to arbitrate; and, if so,
(2) whether the scope of that agreement to arbitrate
encompasses the claims at issue. See id. at 1130; see
also Chiron Corp. v. Ortho Diagnostic Sys., Inc., 207
F.3d 1126, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000). If the party seeking to
compel arbitration establishes both factors, the court must
compel arbitration. Id. “The standard for demonstrating
arbitrability is not a high one; in fact, a district court has
little discretion to deny an arbitration motion, since the
[FAA] is phrased in mandatory terms.” Republic of Nicar.
v. Std. Fruit Co., 937 F.2d 469, 475 (9th Cir. 1991).
Additionally, in cases where the parties “clearly and
unmistakably intend to delegate the power to decide
arbitrability to an arbitrator,” the Court's inquiry is
“limited...[to] whether the assertion of arbitrability is
‘wholly groundless.’ ” Qualcomm Inc. v. Nokia Corp., 466
F.3d 1366, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (applying Ninth Circuit
law). Nonetheless, “arbitration is a matter of contract
and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration
any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit.”
AT&T Techs., Inc. v. Commc'ns Workers of Am., 475 U.S.
643, 648 (1986) (quoting Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf
Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960)).
The FAA creates a body of federal substantive law of
arbitrability that requires a healthy regard for the federal
policy favoring arbitration and preempts state law to the
contrary. Volt Info.  Scis., Inc. v. Bd. Of Trs. Of Leland
Stanford Junior Univ., 489 U.S. 467, 475–79 (1989). State
law is not entirely displaced from the federal arbitration
analysis, however. See Ticknor, 265 F.3d at 936-37.
When deciding whether the parties agreed to arbitrate
a certain matter, courts generally apply ordinary state
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law principles of contract interpretation. First Options of
Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, 514 U.S. 938, 944 (1995). Parties
may also contract to arbitrate according to state rules,
so long as those rules do not offend the federal policy
favoring arbitration. Volt, 489 U.S. at 478– 79. Thus,
in determining whether parties have agreed to arbitrate
a dispute, the court applies “general state-law principles
of contract interpretation, while giving due regard to
the federal policy in favor of arbitration by resolving
ambiguities as to the scope of arbitration in favor of
arbitration.” Mundi v. Union Sec. Life Ins. Co., 555 F.3d
1042, 1044 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Wagner v. Stratton
Oakmont, Inc., 83 F.3d 1046, 1049 (9th Cir. 1996)).
“[A]s with any other contract, the parties' intentions
control, but those intentions are generously construed
as to issues of arbitrability.” Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v.
Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 626 (1985).
If a contract contains an arbitration clause, there is a
presumption of arbitrability, AT&T, 475 U.S. at 650, and
“any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues
should be resolved in favor of arbitration,” Moses H. Cone
Mem'l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24–25
(1983).
III. DISCUSSION
*6  According to Ticketmaster Defendants, Plaintiffs'
claims against Ticketmaster Defendants are subject
to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration provision
contained within the Ticketmaster Website's TOU. In
opposition, Plaintiffs dispute several aspects of the TOU.
First, Plaintiffs contend that they never agreed to the
TOU on the Ticketmaster Website. Second, Plaintiffs
contend that, even assuming that they did agree to the
TOU, the arbitration provision contained within the TOU
is unconscionable and thus unenforceable. The Court
considers these arguments in turn.
A.Whether Plaintiffs Agreed to the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU
Plaintiffs first argue that they never agreed to the TOU
when they purchased their tickets and parking passes
through the Ticketmaster Website. “Before a party to a
lawsuit can be ordered to arbitrate and thus be deprived
of a day in court, there should be an express, unequivocal
agreement to that effect. Only when there is no genuine
issue of fact concerning the formation of the agreement
should the court decide as a matter of law that the parties
did or did not enter into such an agreement.” Cordas
v. Uber Tech., 228 F. Supp. 3d 985, 988 (N.D. Cal.
2017) (quoting Three Valleys Mun. Water Dist. V.E.F.
Hutton & Co., 925 F.2d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 1991)).
“Questions of contract formation are questions of state
law.” Id. In California, “mutual assent is the key to
contract formation.” Id.
Here, the existence of mutual assent between Plaintiffs and
Ticketmaster Defendants implicates the law of Internet-
based contract formation. As the Ninth Circuit has
explained, “[c]ontracts formed on the Internet come
primarily in two flavors: ‘clickwrap’ (or ‘click-through’)
agreements, in which website users are required to click on
an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms
and conditions of use; and ‘browsewrap’ agreements,
where a website's terms and conditions of use are generally
posted on the website via a hyperlink at the bottom of the
screen.” Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171,
1175–76 (9th Cir. 2014). “Unlike a clickwrap agreement,
a browsewrap agreement does not require the user to
manifest assent to the terms and conditions expressly...
[a] party instead gives his assent simply by using the
website.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). “Indeed,
‘in a pure-form browsewrap agreement, the website will
contain a notice that—by merely using the services of,
obtaining information from, or initiating applications
within the website—the user is agreeing to and is bound
by the site's terms of service.’ ” Id. (quoting Fteja v.
Facebook, Inc., 841 F. Supp. 2d 829, 837 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)).
“Thus, ‘by visiting the website—something that the user
has already done—the user agrees to the Terms of Use
not listed on the site itself but available only by clicking
a hyperlink.’ ” Id.  Courts have held that the “validity of
[a] browsewrap contract depends on whether the user has
actual or constructive knowledge of a website's terms and
conditions.” Id.  (citing cases).
Plaintiffs contend that the Ticketmaster Website's TOU,
and thus the arbitration provision within the TOU,
is contained within an unenforceable “browsewrap”
agreement. By contrast, Ticketmaster Defendants argue
that the TOU is a “clickwrap” agreement, and that courts
routinely enforce “clickwrap” agreements. To resolve this
dispute, the Court first reviews the process of purchasing
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a ticket or parking pass on the Ticketmaster Website. The
Court then considers whether the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU are more properly described as a “browsewrap” or
“clickwrap” agreement, and whether Plaintiffs assented to
the TOU in purchasing their tickets and parking passes on
the Ticketmaster Website.
*7  In purchasing tickets and parking passes from the
Ticketmaster Website, Plaintiffs were presented with the
opportunity to assent to the TOU on at least two
occasions. First, in order to purchase their tickets and
parking passes, Plaintiffs would have had to either register
a Ticketmaster Website account or sign in to an existing
account. See Han Decl. ¶¶ 4–5. If Plaintiffs did not have
a Ticketmaster Website account at the time that Plaintiffs
purchased their tickets and parking passes in 2015 and
2016, Plaintiffs would have been required to complete the
information on the “Create Account” webpage. ECF No.
60-4. After filling in the required information, Plaintiffs
would have been required to click “Accept and Continue”
to create a Ticketmaster Website account. Id. Below the
“Accept and Continue” button is the statement, in black
bold text against a white background, “By continuing past
this page, you agree to our terms of use.” Id. The phrase
“terms of use” is in blue text, and the text is a hyperlink
to the Ticketmaster Website's TOU, which contain the
arbitration provision at issue. Id.
If Plaintiffs already registered a Ticketmaster Website
account at the time that Plaintiffs purchased their tickets
and parking passes in 2015 and 2016, Plaintiffs would
have been required to sign in to their accounts in order to
purchase their tickets and parking passes. See Han Decl.
¶ 5. In order to sign in to their Ticketmaster Website
accounts, Plaintiffs would have been required to complete
the required fields on the “Sign In” webpage, and click the
button “Sign In” to proceed past the page. Id.  Below the
“Sign In” button is the sentence, in black bold text against
a white background, “By continuing past this page, you
agree to our terms of use.” Id. Again, “terms of use” is in
blue text and is a hyperlink to the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU, which contain the arbitration provision at issue. Id.
Second, once Plaintiffs either registered an account or
signed in to their existing account, and once Plaintiffs
selected the tickets and parking passes that Plaintiffs
wished to purchase, Plaintiffs would have been presented
with a page to complete their purchase. See ECF No.
60-6. On the screen in which Plaintiffs were required to
enter their credit card and billing information, Plaintiffs
would have been required to click the “Submit Order”
button to submit and finalize their order. Id. Below the
“Submit Order” button is the sentence, in black bold
text against a white background, “By continuing past
this page, you agree to our terms of use.” Id. Again, the
sentence “terms of use” is in blue font, and is a hyperlink
to the Ticketmaster Website's TOU, which contain the
arbitration provision at issue. Id.  In addition, on the
same “Submit Order” page—and to the left of the “Submit
Order” button—is the sentence: “By clicking the ‘Submit
Order’ button, you are agreeing to the Ticketmaster
Purchase Policy and Privacy Policy.” Id. The phrase
“Purchase Policy” is in blue font and is a hyperlink
to the Ticketmaster Website's Purchase Policy. The first
paragraph of the Purchase Policy instructs users of the
Ticketmaster Website that the Ticketmaster Website's
Terms of Use “govern your use of this Site.” See ECF No.
60-7.
Given the process described above for assenting to
the Ticketmaster Website's TOU, the Court finds that
the Ticketmaster Website's TOU are neither a “true
browsewrap” agreement nor a “pure-form clickwrap
agreement.” See Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 836–
37. Contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU are not a true browsewrap agreement—
in which a user purportedly assents to terms of service
merely by browsing a website without further action—
because, as discussed above, a user of the Ticketmaster
Website must take some affirmative actions to agree to
the Ticketmaster Website's TOU. Specifically, prior to
making a purchase on the Ticketmaster Website, a user
of the Ticketmaster Website must click either “Accept
and Continue” or “Sign In”—depending on whether the
individual has an existing Ticketmaster Website account
—and a user must click “Submit Order” to finalize their
purchase. Below the buttons “Accept and Continue,”
“Sign In,” and “Submit Order” is the sentence “By
continuing past this page, you agree to our terms of use.”
See, e.g., ECF No. 60-6. This sentence is in bold black
font and is easily visible to a user before the user clicks
on any of these buttons. See id. In addition, users are
also told next to the “Submit Order” button that “By
clicking the ‘Submit Order’ button, you are agreeing to
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the Ticketmaster Purchase Policy and Privacy Policy.” Id.
The phrase “Purchase Policy” is in blue font, and is a
hyperlink to the Ticketmaster Website's Purchase Policy,
which instructs users that the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU “govern your use of this Site.” See ECF No. 60-7.
Accordingly, to make a purchase on the Ticketmaster
Website, a user must make at least two affirmative clicks
after being told that, “By continuing past this page, you
agree to our terms of use.” See, e.g., ECF No. 60-6.
*8  Although the Court finds that the Ticketmaster
Website is not a pure “browsewrap” agreement, the
Court disagrees with Ticketmaster Defendants that the
Ticketmaster Website's TOU is a “pure-form clickwrap
agreement.” Fteja, 841 F. Supp. 2d at 836–37. With a
“pure-form clickwrap agreement,” “users typically click
an ‘I agree’ box after being presented with a list of terms
and conditions of use.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted). Here, “[w]hile the Terms of Use require the user
to click on [‘Accept and Continue,’ ‘Sign In,’ or ‘Submit
Order’] to assent, they do not contain any mechanism
that forces the user to actually examine the terms
before assenting.” Id. Similarly, users of the Ticketmaster
Website are not required to click an explicitly labeled
“I agree” button to assent to the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU. Rather, users must click buttons that are labeled
for other actions—such as “Sign In”—and these buttons
do not themselves explicitly reference the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU. Thus, the Ticketmaster Website lacks
characteristics of a pure clickwrap agreement, in which
website users “are presented with the proposed license
terms and forced to expressly and unambiguously
manifest either assent or rejection prior to being given
access to the product.” Id.
Accordingly, the Court finds that the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU “are somewhat like a browsewrap
agreement in that the [TOU] are only visible via a
hyperlink” provided below the buttons “Accept and
Continue,” “Sign In,” and “Submit Order.” Id. at 838
. However, the Ticketmaster Website's TOU are “also
somewhat like a clickwrap agreement in that the user must
do something else” other than simply browse the website
“to assent to the hyperlinked terms.” Id. Specifically, the
user must click “Accept and Continue,” “Sign In,” and
“Submit Order” when signing in to their accounts and
finalizing their orders. Id. (finding Facebook's terms of use
fell somewhere in between a pure browsewrap agreement
and a pure clickwrap agreement because, although users
were required to take an affirmative action—clicking
“Sign Up”—to agree to the terms of use, users could
“assent whether or not the user” was presented with the
terms of use because the terms of use were available only
via a hyperlink below the “Sign Up” button).
In any event, regardless of whether the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU are most appropriately labeled as a
“browsewrap” or a “clickwrap” agreement, the Court
finds that Plaintiffs assented to the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU in purchasing their tickets and parking passes on the
Ticketmaster Website. Indeed, courts have “consistently
enforced” arbitration clauses contained within terms of
use on similarly designed websites. See, e.g., Rodriguez
v. Experian Serv. Corp., 2015 WL 12656919, at *2 (C.D.
Cal. Oct. 5, 2015) (enforcing arbitration clause contained
within terms of use where “Website contained a hyperlink
to the Terms of Use at the bottom of every page and
included an express disclosure and acknowledgement,
which stated ‘By clicking the button above...you agree
to our Terms of Use,’ ” which were hyperlinked); Graf
v. Match.com, LLC, 2015 WL 4263957, at *4 (C.D. Cal.
July 10, 2015) (enforcing arbitration clause contained
within terms of use where “all users of the Match.com
website during the relevant time period were required to
affirmatively agree to the Terms of Use when they clicked
on a ‘Continue’ or other similar button on the registration
page where it was explained that by clicking on that
button, the user was affirming that they would be bound
by the Terms of Use, which were always hyperlinked
and available for review”); Crawford v. Beachbody, LLC,
2014 WL 6606563, at *2–3 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 5, 2014)
(enforcing forum selection clause contained within terms
and conditions of website where, at the final page of
placing an order, plaintiff was required to click on “Place
Order” and language on the same page stated that “by
clicking Place Order below, you are agreeing” to the
website's terms and conditions, which were hyperlinked).
As set forth in detail above, the Ticketmaster Website
prominently informed Plaintiffs on at least two occasions
prior to purchasing their ticket or parking pass that,
by clicking either “Accept and Continue” or “Sign In”
to register or sign in to their account, and by clicking
“Submit Order” to finalize their purchase, Plaintiffs
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were agreeing to the Ticketmaster Website's Terms of
Use, “which were always hyperlinked and available for
review.” Graf, 2015 WL 4263957, at *4. In addition,
Plaintiffs were explicitly told that by clicking “Submit
Order” they were agreeing to the Ticketmaster Website's
Purchase Policy, which further informed Plaintiffs in
the first paragraph that their use of the Ticketmaster
Website was governed by the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU. Indeed, because of the Ticketmaster Website's
design and the process discussed above for assenting to
the TOU, another district court has enforced the exact
same arbitration clause contained within the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU that is at issue here. See Goza v. Multi-
Purpose Civic Ctr. Facilities Bd. For Pulaski Cty., 2014
WL 3672128, at *3 (W.D. Ark. July 23, 2014) (finding
there was mutual assent to the Ticketmaster Website's
Terms of Use because a user must assent to the Terms of
Use in registering an account and purchasing tickets on
the Ticketmaster Website).
*9  Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiffs accepted the
TOU when Plaintiffs made their ticket and parking pass
purchases on the Ticketmaster Website in 2015 and 2016,
and thus Plaintiffs assented to the arbitration provision
contained within the Ticketmaster Website's TOU. See,
e.g., Graf, 2015 WL 4263957, at *4 (finding plaintiffs
consented to the terms of use on website because Plaintiffs
“were required to affirmatively agree to the Terms of
Use when they clicked on a ‘Continue’ or other similar
button”); Rodriguez, 2015 WL 12656919, at *2 (finding
Plaintiffs consented to terms of use where the defendant's
website “contained a hyperlink to the Terms of Use at the
bottom of every page and included an express disclosure
and acknowledgement, which stated ‘By clicking the
button above...you agree to our Terms of Use’ ”).
However, the Court must deal with a final issue. On
August 1, 2017—nearly two months after Plaintiffs filed
their opposition on June 16, 2017, and nearly a full
month after Ticketmaster Defendants filed their reply in
support of their motion to compel arbitration—Plaintiffs
filed a “Request for Judicial Notice” in support of their
opposition. See ECF No. 75. Plaintiffs' August 1, 2017
Request for Judicial Notice requested that the Court
take judicial notice of screenshots of the Ticketmaster
Website's account registration and sign-in pages, which
Plaintiffs accessed on July 31, 2017. Id.Unlike the
screenshots of the account registration and sign-in pages
attached to Ticketmaster Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration, 3  the July 31, 2017 screenshots of the account
registration and sign-in pages attached to Plaintiffs'
August 1, 2017 Request for Judicial Notice do “not
contain any hyperlink to Defendants' Terms of Use.” Id.
at 3. Rather, below the buttons “Accept and Continue”
and “Sign In,” there is no text whatsoever. See id. at 6–8.
For several reasons, Plaintiffs' August 1, 2017 Request for
Judicial Notice does not change the Court's conclusion
that Plaintiffs assented to the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU in purchasing their tickets and parking passes on
the Ticketmaster Website. First, Plaintiffs' August 1,
2017 request for judicial notice is untimely. Ticketmaster
Defendants' motion to compel arbitration argued that
Plaintiffs assented to the TOU in registering an account
and clicking “Accept and Continue” and “Sign In,”
and Ticketmaster Defendants included with their motion
screenshots of these webpages illustrating that these pages
contained the language “[b]y continuing past this page,
you agree to our terms of use.” See ECF No. 60-5.
Plaintiffs did not argue in their June 16, 2017 opposition
that the Ticketmaster Website's account registration and
sign in pages did not contain the language “[b]y continuing
past this page, you agree to our terms of use,” as Plaintiffs'
August 1, 2017 Request for Judicial Notice now implies.
See ECF No. 67. Plaintiffs do not provide any explanation
for why Plaintiffs did not raise this issue in their June 16,
2017 opposition, and instead have raised it nearly a month
after Ticketmaster Defendants filed their Reply on July
10, 2017. See ECF No. 75. Accordingly, because Plaintiffs
failed to raise this issue in their opposition, and because
Plaintiffs have not provided any reasons for why Plaintiffs
waited until August 1, 2017 to raise the issue, the Court
finds the Plaintiffs' August 1, 2017 Request for Judicial
Notice untimely.
*10  Second, Plaintiffs' August 1, 2017 Request for
Judicial Notice states only that the registration and sign
in pages accessed on July 31, 2017 did not contain the
language “[b]y continuing past this page, you agree to our
terms of use.” See ECF No. 75, at 3. Plaintiffs do not state
in their August 1, 2017 Request for Judicial Notice—and
Plaintiffs did not argue in their June 16, 2017 opposition—
that the Ticketmaster Website's account registration and
Goldman, Eric 8/21/2017
For Educational Use Only
ABDUL NEVAREZ, et al., Plaintiffs, v. FORTY NINERS..., Slip Copy (2017)
 © 2017 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works. 9
sign in pages did not contain a hyperlink to the TOU
in 2015 and 2016, which were the years that Plaintiffs
bought the tickets and parking passes at issue. See ECF
No. 67. Thus, the website screenshot taken on July 31,
2017 is irrelevant to the instant motion, which relates
to Plaintiffs' purchases on the Ticketmaster websites for
events in 2015 and 2016. See SAC ¶¶ 34, 47. Indeed, the
declaration issued in support of Ticketmaster Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration states that “[s]ince 2003,
users must click an[ ] ‘Accept and Continue’ button as
part[ ] of the website's account setup procedure,” and that
“[i]f a user already has an account, then he or she must
log in.” Han Decl. ¶ 4–5. “Directly below” these buttons,
the declaration states, “the customer is informed that by
using the website, the customer agrees to be bound by the
Terms of Use.” Han Decl. ¶ 4–5. Accordingly, based on
the evidence before the Court, Plaintiffs were presented
with the Ticketmaster Websites Terms of Use at the time
that they either registered for or signed into their accounts
in 2015 and 2016, the years that Plaintiffs purchased the
tickets and parking passes at issue. See SAC ¶¶ 24, 27, 34,
35.
Finally, even assuming that the Ticketmaster Website's
account registration and sign in pages did not contain
the statement “[b]y continuing past this page, you
agree to our terms of use” at the time that Plaintiffs
purchased their tickets and parking passes, the Court
would still find that Plaintiffs assented to the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU in purchasing their tickets and parking
passes. Significantly, Plaintiffs' August 1, 2017 Request
for Judicial Notice contains no argument or evidence
regarding the Ticketmaster Website's “Submit Order”
page for purchasing tickets and parking passes. See ECF
No. 67. As discussed above, the Ticketmaster Website's
“Submit Order” page informs users that “[b]y continuing
past this page, you agree to our terms of use,” which
are hyperlinked. See ECF No. 60-6. Further, the “Submit
Order” page also contains language to the left of the
“Submit Order” button that instructs that, “By clicking
the ‘Submit Order’ button, you are agreeing to the
Ticketmaster Purchase Policy and Privacy Policy.” Id.
The phrase “Purchase Policy” is in blue font, and is a
hyperlink to the Ticketmaster Website's Purchase Policy,
which instructs users that the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU “govern your use of this Site.” See ECF No. 60-7.
Thus, even assuming that the Ticketmaster Website's
account registration and sign in pages did not require
Plaintiffs to manifest assent to the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU, Plaintiffs would still have been required to manifest
assent to the Terms of Use in clicking “Submit Order” to
purchase their tickets and parking passes. Id. Accordingly,
even if the Court were to consider Plaintiffs' August 1,
2017 request for judicial notice, the Court would still
find that Plaintiffs manifested assent to the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU in purchasing their tickets and parking
passes from the Ticketmaster Website in 2015 and 2016.
B. Arbitrability
Having concluded that Plaintiffs assented to the
Ticketmaster Website's TOU, and thus assented to the
arbitration provision contained within the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU, the remaining question is whether that
arbitration provision governs the instant dispute between
the parties. Here, Ticketmaster Defendants argue that
not only is the instant lawsuit subject to arbitration,
but indeed the parties have clearly and unmistakably
delegated the threshold question of arbitrability to the
arbitrator. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
agrees.
“Under federal law, ‘[t]he question whether parties have
submitted a particular dispute to arbitration...is an issue
for judicial determination unless the parties clearly and
unmistakably provide otherwise.’ ” Loewen v. Lyft, 129 F.
Supp. 3d 945, 954 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (quoting Howsam v.
Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 537 U.S. 79, 83 (2002)). “If the
parties clearly and unmistakably assign the arbitrability
question to the arbitrator, ‘the court should perform a
second, more limited inquiry to determine whether the
assertion of arbitrability is ‘wholly groundless.’ ” Id.  “An
arbitration provision that explicitly refers arbitrability
questions to an arbitrator is evidence that the parties
clearly and unmistakably have referred the arbitrability
question to the arbitrator.” Id.
*11  The parties do not dispute that the arbitration clause
contained within the Ticketmaster Website's TOU clearly
and unmistakably delegates the question of arbitrability
to the arbitrator. The arbitration provision explicitly
provides:
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The arbitrator and not any federal,
state or local court or agency shall
have exclusive authority to the
extent permitted by law to resolve
all disputes arising out of or relating
to the interpretation, applicability,
enforceability or formation for
this Agreement, including but not
limited to any claim that all or any
part of this Agreement is void or
voidable.
See ECF No. 60-2, at 6.
Plaintiffs' only remaining defense to arbitration is that
this delegation provision is unconscionable. Significantly,
because the parties agree that the arbitration clause
clearly and unmistakably delegates arbitrability to the
arbitrator, the Court's unconscionability inquiry is limited
to the delegation provision specifically, rather than the
arbitration clause or the Ticketmaster Website's TOU
as a whole. See Brennan v. Opus Bank, 796 F.3d 1125,
1132 (9th Cir. 2015) (“Because a court must enforce
an agreement that, as here, clearly and unmistakably
delegates arbitrability questions to the arbitrator, the only
remaining question is whether the particular agreement to
delegate arbitrability—the Delegation Provision—is itself
unconscionable”).
“[T]he core concern of unconscionability doctrine is
the absence of meaningful choice on the part of one
of the parties together with contract terms which are
unreasonably favorable to the other party.” Sonic-
Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno, 57 Cal. 4th 1109, 1145
(2013) (quotations and citations omitted). “[T]he party
opposing arbitration bears the burden of proving any
defense, such as unconscionability.” Pinnacle Museum
Tower Ass'n Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC, 55 Cal.
4th 223, 236 (2012). For unconscionability, California
requires a showing of both procedural and substantive
unconscionability, balanced on a sliding scale. See
Patterson, 14 Cal. App. 4th at 1664 (noting analytical
approaches to unconscionability). The Court addresses
both procedural and substantive unconscionability in turn
below.
1. Procedural Unconscionability
The Court first considers whether the delegation
provision is procedurally unconscionable. The procedural
component of unconscionability “focuses on the factors
of oppression and surprise.” Patterson v. ITT Consumer
Fin. Corp., 14 Cal. App. 4th 1659, 1664 (1993)
(citations omitted). “Oppression results where there is no
real negotiation of contract terms because of unequal
bargaining power.” Id. “ ‘Surprise’ involves the extent to
which the supposedly agreed-upon terms of the bargain
are hidden in a prolix printed form drafted by the party
seeking to enforce the disputed terms.” Id.According
to Plaintiffs, the delegation provision at issue here
is procedurally unconscionable because the delegation
provision is contained within a contract of adhesion, and
because Plaintiffs were not given notice of the provision at
the time they purchased their tickets and parking passes
on the Ticketmaster Website.
“Unconscionability analysis begins with an inquiry into
whether the contract is one of adhesion.” Armendariz,
24 Cal. 4th at 113. An adhesive contract “signifies a
standardized contract, which, imposed and drafted by
the party of superior bargaining strength, relegates to
the subscribing party only the opportunity to adhere to
the contract or reject it.” Id. (citation omitted). Here,
the Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the delegation
provision is contained within a contract of adhesion
because Ticketmaster Defendants drafted the TOU, and
users of the Ticketmaster Website were given “only the
opportunity to adhere to [the TOU] or reject” them. See
id. Nonetheless, although the Court agrees with Plaintiffs
that the delegation provision is contained within a
contract of adhesion, the Court concludes that this creates
only a “low degree of procedural unconscionability” in
this case. Loewen, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (citing Sanchez
v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th 899, 915
(2015)). Other than the adhesive nature of the contract,
there are no other indicia of oppression or surprise with
regards to the delegation provision. As set forth above,
Plaintiffs were prominently notified that their use of the
Ticketmaster Website was governed by the Ticketmaster
Website's TOU, and Plaintiffs were provided with a
hyperlink to the Ticketmaster Website's TOU when
Plaintiffs registered for the Ticketmaster Website, signed
in to their account, and submitted their orders. The
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arbitration provision within the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU is set forth in its own paragraph of the TOU, and it is
underneath a bold heading entitled “Disputes, Including
Mandatory Arbitration and Class Action Waiver.” ECF
No. 60-2, at 6. The paragraph delegating arbitrability
to the arbitrator is contained within this arbitration
provision in clear language. See id. District courts
have consistently rejected procedural unconscionability
arguments in similar circumstances. See, e.g., Loewen, 129
F. Supp. 3d at 957 (rejecting argument that delegation
provision was highly procedurally unconscionable, even
though the provision was contained in a lengthy terms
of service available to users via hyperlink, because
users of the website had the opportunity to read
the terms of service prior to agreeing and because
the arbitration provision contained within the terms
of service was “under a bolded, large font heading
relating to arbitration”); Graf, 2015 WL 4263957, at *5
(finding arbitration provision was “at most minimally
procedurally unconscionable,” and ultimately enforcing
the arbitration provision, where the arbitration provision
was contained within a contract of adhesion but was
nonetheless “presented as its own section of the Terms of
Service” with bold font “to draw the reader's attention to
it”).
*12  Furthermore, although users of the Ticketmaster
Website must agree to the Ticketmaster Website's TOU to
purchase tickets and parking passes on the Ticketmaster
Website, the degree of procedural unconscionability in
this case is reduced because Plaintiffs were not required
to use the Ticketmaster Website to purchase tickets for
events at the Stadium. Indeed, Plaintiffs' own SAC shows
that Plaintiffs made purchases from the Stadium Box
Office itself on some occasions, rather than from the
Ticketmaster Website. See, e.g. SAC ¶ 24. Thus, because
Plaintiffs were “free to bypass Ticketmaster and purchase
tickets directly from the box office,” there is a low degree
of procedural unconscionability in this case even though
the delegation provision was presented to Plaintiffs in a
contract of adhesion. See Goza, 2014 WL 3672128, at *5
(finding that the same arbitration provision at issue here
had a low degree of procedural unconscionability because
individuals are not required to use the Ticketmaster
Website to purchase tickets for events).
Thus, although the Court finds that the
delegation provision contains a degree of procedural
unconscionability because it is contained within a contract
of adhesion, the Court concludes that this creates
only a “low degree of procedural unconscionability”
in this case. Loewen, 129 F. Supp. 3d at 944 (citing
Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co., LLC, 61 Cal. 4th
899, 915 (2015)). Accordingly, because the degree of
procedural unconscionability is low, the Court will
enforce the delegation provision “unless the degree
of substantive unconscionability is high.” Id. (internal
quotation marks omitted). The Court turns to address
substantive unconscionability.
2. Substantive Unconscionability
As set forth above, under California law, a delegation
provision must be both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable to be deemed unenforceable. Substantive
unconscionability arises when a provision is so “overly
harsh or one-sided” that it falls outside the “reasonable
expectations” of the non-drafting party. Gutierrez, 114
Cal. App. 4th at 88 (quoting Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th
at 113–14). It is not enough that terms are slightly
one-sided or confer more benefits on a particular
party; a substantively unconscionable term must be so
unreasonable and one-sided as to “shock the conscience.”
Am. Software, Inc. v. Ali, 46 Cal. App. 4th 1386, 1391
(1996).
Plaintiffs' primary argument in support of finding the
delegation provision substantively unconscionable is that,
if Plaintiffs were required to arbitrate even the threshold
question of arbitrability, the process of arbitration would
subject Plaintiffs to “substantial costs” that they cannot
afford. See Opp. at 17–18. According to Plaintiffs, in order
to participate in arbitration, Plaintiffs will have to pay a
non-refundable filing fee of $2,000 and professional fees
of a mediator, which will range from $6,000 to $9,000 per
day. Id. Plaintiffs present affidavits indicating that their
income is such that they cannot afford these high costs
because their disposable income is less than $100 a month.
See ECF No. 68-13.
For several reasons, however, Plaintiffs' argument
regarding arbitration expenses is not persuasive. First, to
the extent that Plaintiffs are actually indigent, “JAMS
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waives all arbitration fees for indigent consumers in
California.” See Reply at 10–11. Specifically, JAMS
provides that in California, consumers “with a gross
monthly income of less than 300% of the federal poverty
guidelines are entitled to a waiver of arbitration fees.” See
ECF No. 69-6, at 2.
Second, even if Plaintiffs are not indigent, the arbitration
provision contained within the Ticketmaster Website's
TOU provides that arbitration will be conducted by
JAMS under JAMS's rules, including under JAMS's
“Consumer Arbitration Standards of Minimum Fairness”
where applicable. ECF No. 60-2, at 6. JAMS's Consumer
Arbitration Standards of Minimum Fairness provide that
“the only fee required to be paid by the consumer is
$250, which is approximately equivalent to current Court
filing fees. All other costs must be borne by the company,
including any remaining JAMS Case Management Fee
and all professional fees for the arbitrator's services.”
See ECF No. 67-1. Thus, under JAMS, Plaintiffs' total
arbitration expenses will very likely not exceed $250. Id.
Indeed, in Goza, in which the district court addressed the
exact same arbitration clause at issue here, the district
court recognized that the consumer would be required
to pay only $250 to arbitrate his or her dispute against
Ticketmaster, which was “comparable to fees required to
file a lawsuit.” Goza, 2014 WL 3672128, at *5.
*13  Moreover, although Plaintiffs cite several cases
in which courts have held arbitration provisions
substantively unconscionable because the plaintiff would
have been required to pay excessive arbitration costs,
those cases are readily distinguishable. In the cases relied
upon by Plaintiffs, the arbitration provision at issue
explicitly “required [the plaintiff] to pay half of the arbitral
fees.” See, e.g., Saravia v. Dynamex, Inc., 310 F.R.D. 412,
421 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Chavarria v. Ralphs Grocery Co.,
733 F.3d 916, 925 (9th Cir. 2013) (finding substantive
unconscionability where arbitration policy “require[d]
that an employee pay half of [the fees for a qualified
arbitrator]—$3,500 to $7,000—for each day of the
arbitration,” in addition to other offending terms). Here,
as discussed above, the Ticketmaster Website's arbitration
provision requires Plaintiffs to pay the equivalent of Court
filing fees and requires Defendants to bear all other costs
including the arbitrator's professional fees. See ECF No.
60-2, at 6. Thus, the cases relied upon by Plaintiffs are
inapposite.
Plaintiffs speculate that “it is likely that JAMS would
decline to arbitrate this matter,” and thus Plaintiffs would
face higher arbitration costs under different arbitration
rules, because the Ticketmaster Website arbitration clause
contains “offending arbitration terms,” such as limits on
Plaintiffs' statutory remedies. See Opp. at 19. However,
contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the arbitration clause
does not limit Plaintiffs' right to obtain remedies, but
rather provides that “an arbitrator can award on an
individual basis the same damages and relief as a
court (including injunctive and declaratory relief or
statutory damages).” ECF No. 60-2, at 6. Ticketmaster
Defendants themselves recognize in their opposition that
the arbitration provision does not impose any limitations
on Plaintiffs' rights to obtain remedies. See id. at 12–
13. Thus, Plaintiffs' argument that JAMS will decline
to arbitrate this matter—and thus that Plaintiffs will
be required to bear excessive arbitration fees—is wholly
speculative, and does not provide a basis for finding
the arbitration agreement substantively unconscionable.
See, e.g., Pope v. Sonatype, 2015 WL 2174033, at *4
(N.D. Cal. May 8, 2015) (rejecting argument that plaintiff
would be responsible for unreasonable costs in arbitration
where “the most logical interpretation of the Arbitration
Agreement” was that JAMS's minimum standards applied
and thus plaintiff would be required to pay only an
initial case management fee, but not any further fees);
see also Kilgore v. KeyBank, Nat. Ass'n, 718 F.3d
1052, 1058–59 (9th Cir. 2013) (rejecting argument that
arbitration provision was procedurally unconscionable
merely because there was a risk that “students may not be
able to afford arbitration fees”); Goza, 2014 WL 3672128,
at *5 (rejecting Plaintiffs' substantive unconscionability
challenge to same arbitration clause in Ticketmaster
Website's TOU because Plaintiffs would be required to
pay only a $250 fee, which “is comparable to fees required
to file a lawsuit”).
Moreover, even assuming JAMS would decline to
arbitrate this matter, the Ticketmaster Website's
arbitration provision states that Ticketmaster will
reimburse administration and arbitrator fees “for claims
totaling less than $10,000 unless the arbitrator determines
the claims are frivolous, but in no event will we pay
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for attorney's fees.” ECF No. 60-2. As Ticketmaster
Defendants admit, this clause only means that “although
Defendants will automatically pay for arbitration fees for
small monetary claims regardless of who the prevailing
party is,” Ticketmaster Defendants “will not agree to do
so for attorney's fees.” See Reply at 12. “Nothing in this
language can be construed as a waiver of Plaintiffs' right
to recover attorney's fees pursuant to a prevailing party
provision in a statute, such as the ADA or the Unruh Act.”
Id.
*14  Here, Plaintiffs individual claims likely total less
than $10,000. Plaintiffs assert against the Ticketmaster
Defendants one count under Title III of the ADA and
one count under the Unruh Act. “Monetary damages
are not available in private suits under Title III of the
ADA.” Molski v. M.J. Cable, Inc., 481 F. 3d 724, 730
(9th Cir. 2007). The Unruh Act permits monetary recovery
in the form of “up to a maximum of three times the
amount of actual damages but in no case less than four
thousand dollars.” Cal. Civ. Code § 52(a). “The litigant
need not prove she suffered actual damages to recover the
independent statutory damages of $4,000.” Molski, 481
F.3d at 730.
As far as actual damages, Plaintiffs allege that they
purchased a parking pass from the Ticketmaster Website
in 2015, and that they purchased a set of tickets on the
Ticketmaster Website in 2016. See, e.g., SAC ¶¶ 27, 34.
Plaintiffs allege that Ticketmaster Defendants did not
provide a sufficient number of handicap accessible tickets
and parking passes, which resulted in Plaintiffs having
to spend money on a “VIP” parking pass, and having
to purchase Mr. Nevarez a regular seat to exchange for
a handicap accessible seat on the day of the event. See
id.  However, as Ticketmaster Defendants' records show,
Plaintiffs' total purchases on the Ticketmaster Website for
events at the Stadium in 2015 and 2016 do not exceed
$400. See ECF No. 60-8 (setting forth Plaintiffs' orders
on the Ticketmaster Website). Accordingly, assuming
either that Plaintiffs receive statutory damages of $4,000
for each of Ticketmaster Defendants' two alleged Unruh
Act violations, or that Plaintiffs receive the maximum
of three times their actual damages under the Unruh
Act, Plaintiffs' individual claims against Ticketmaster
Defendants would still likely not total $10,000. Thus,
other than Plaintiffs' speculation, there is no basis in the
SAC to believe that Plaintiffs' damages will total over
$10,000 based on their visits to the Stadium. See generally
SAC.
Thus, although Plaintiffs' contend that arbitration will
impose “substantial costs” on Plaintiffs that they
cannot afford, Plaintiffs have not established substantive
unconscionability. To the extent Plaintiffs are indigent,
Plaintiffs will not pay any arbitration fees. Moreover,
the Ticketmaster Website's arbitration provision requires
Plaintiffs to pay the equivalent of Court filing fees and
requires Defendants to bear all other costs including the
arbitrator's professional fees. See ECF No. 60-2, at 6;
see also Goza, 2014 WL 3672128, at *5 (finding, under
same arbitration provision at issue here, that Plaintiffs
would face only $250 in arbitration fees). Moreover, even
if JAMS Consumer Arbitration Standards of Minimum
Fairness do not apply, Plaintiffs will likely not pay
for the costs of arbitration because their claims against
Ticketmaster Defendants are likely less than $10,000,
and the arbitration provision provides that Ticketmaster
Defendants “will reimburse [arbitration] fees for claims
totaling less than $10,000 unless the arbitrator determines
the claims are frivolous.” See ECF No. 60-2, at 6.
Accordingly, Plaintiffs have not established that the
delegation provision in the arbitration provision is
substantively unconscionable.
Therefore, while the delegation provision contains a low
degree of procedural unconscionability, Plaintiffs have
not met their burden to demonstrate that the delegation
provision is both procedurally and substantively
unconscionable, as required by California law. Thus, the
Court enforces the delegation provision. Accordingly,
the Court need not—and cannot—reach Plaintiffs'
remaining arguments regarding the unconscionability of
the arbitration clause as a whole, which the parties have
clearly and unmistakably delegated to the arbitrator in
the first instance. See ECF No. 60-2 (“The arbitrator
and not any federal, state or local court or agency shall
have exclusive authority to the extent permitted by law
to resolve all disputes arising out of or relating to the
interpretation, applicability, enforceability or formation
for this Agreement, including but not limited to any
claim that all or any part of this Agreement is void or
voidable.”).
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IV. CONCLUSION
*15  For the foregoing reasons, Ticketmaster Defendants'
motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. Plaintiffs'
claims against Ticketmaster Defendants are DISMISSED
without prejudice. See Sparling v. Hoffman Constr. Co.,
864 F.2d 635, 638 (9th Cir. 1988) (stating that, when
arbitration is mandatory, court shave discretion to stay
the case under 9 U.S.C. § 3 or dismiss the litigation
entirely); Tompkins v. 23andMe, Inc., 2014 WL 2903752,
at *18 (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2014) (dismissing claims
without prejudice where arbitration was mandatory and
the parties did not identify any concerns for why a stay was
more appropriate over dismissal). IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: August 15, 2017
LUCY H. KOH
United States District Judge
All Citations
Slip Copy, 2017 WL 3492110
Footnotes
1 Plaintiff DeFrancesco does not allege that he ever used the Ticketmaster Website, and thus DeFrancesco does not
appear to have any claims against Ticketmaster Defendants. Indeed, Plaintiffs' motion in opposition refers only to the
Nevarezes as “Plaintiffs,” without any mention of DeFrancesco. See Opp. at 9. Accordingly, the term “Plaintiffs” in this
order will refer only to the Nevarezes, who both used the Ticketmaster Website and allege claims against Ticketmaster
Defendants.
2 Plaintiffs object to the fact that Ticketmaster Defendants raised new evidence and arguments for the first time in their
Reply. See ECF No. 70. Specifically, Plaintiffs contend that Ticketmaster Defendants attached the 2015 and 2016
versions of the TOU only in their Reply, but not in their motion, and thus the Court may not consider these versions of the
TOU. The Court disagrees. In their motion to compel arbitration, Ticketmaster Defendants stated that the Ticketmaster
Website has had an arbitration provision since June 15, 2011, and that this arbitration has not changed since Plaintiffs
used the Ticketmaster Website. See Han Decl. ¶ 2. Ticketmaster Defendants attached to their motion to compel arbitration
the most recent version of the Ticketmaster Website TOU, which had last been updated in 2017. See id.; see ECF No.
60-2. In opposition, Plaintiffs argued that Ticketmaster Defendants failed to attach the 2015 and 2016 TOU, which were
effective when Plaintiffs made their purchases. See ECF No. 69-1. Plaintiffs speculated that the 2015 and 2016 TOU
were meaningfully different from the 2017 TOU. See id. Accordingly, in their Reply, Ticketmaster Defendants attached the
2015 and 2016 versions of the TOU. See ECF No. 69-1. The 2015 and 2016 TOU show that, as Ticketmaster Defendants
argued in their original motions, the 2015 and 2016 versions versions contained the same arbitration provision as the
2017 TOU. Moreover, the 2015 and 2016 TOU as a whole are substantially the same as the 2017 TOU as a whole. See id.
3 The screenshots of the account registration and sign-in pages attached to Ticketmaster Defendants' motion to compel
arbitration are not dated. See ECF No. 60-2 & 60-1. However, the declaration to which the screenshots are attached was
executed on May 16, 2017. See Han Decl. The declaration states that “[s]ince 2003, users must click an[ ] ‘Accept and
Continue’ button as part[ ] of the website's account setup procedure,” and that “[i]f a user already has an account, then
he or she must log in.” Han Decl. ¶ 4–5 (emphasis added). “Directly below” these buttons, the declaration states, “the
customer is informed that by using the website, the customer agrees to be bound by the Terms of Use.” Id. Accordingly,
although Ticketmaster Defendants' screenshots are not dated, the accompanying declaration was issued on May 16,
2017 and states that the Ticketmaster Website has contained this language since 2003. Id.
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